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Case No. 20150454-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff!Appellee,
V.

SPENCER SCOTT RICHARDSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Spencer Scott Richardson appeals from sentences for retail theft, a
third degree felony, and for violating probation following conviction of
possession or use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony.
Richardson seeks either resentencing or withdrawal of his guilty plea for
retail theft.

Under Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(e), this Court has

jurisdiction to consider Richardson's challenge insofar as he seeks
resentencing.
,

This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider Richardson's

request to withdraw his guilty plea. Richardson did not move to withdraw
the plea before the district court announced sentence. Utah courts would
have jurisdiction to grant relief from the plea itself only in an action filed

under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b),
(c) (West Supp. 2015); Grimmett v. State, 2007 UT 11,

,rs, 152 P.3d 306 ("Utah

Code section 77-13-6(2)(b) establishes the filing limitations that govern a
criminal defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea.

These filing

liinitations are jurisdictional.").

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
While he was on probation for a drug-related offense ("the drug
case"), Spencer Scott Richardson was charged with and pleaded guilty to
retail theft ("the theft case"). As part of the plea bargain, the prosecutor
agreed to affirmatively recommend probation in the theft case and to
recommend that probation be revoked and reinstated in the drug case. The
agreement was silent as to whether the prosecutor would recommend jail
time as a condition of probation. At sentencing, defense counsel requested
probation, but the prosecutor made no recommendation. Defense counsel
neither objected, moved for withdrawal of the plea, nor requested an order
cmnpelling the prosecutor to abide by the agreement.

However, Adult

Probation & Parole (" AP&P")- both in the presentence report and at
G

sentencing-recommended that Richardson serve one year in jail for the
drug case, followed by three years on probation for the theft case.

The

district court ordered Richardson to serve one year in jail in both cases, to
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run concurrently, followed by a three-year probation term in the theft case.
The court also made several statements indicating that it believed a jail
sentence was necessary in light of Richardson's long history of probation
violations in the drug case and other prior cases.
1. Was Richardson's counsel ineffective because he did not object
to the prosecutor's failure to affirmatively recommend probation when
AP&P had already recommended probation and the district court
ultimately imposed probation?

Standard of Review. Because Richardson did not raise his ineffective
assistance clahn below, this Court reviews the issue as a matter of law. State

v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, if 6, 89 P.3d 162.
2.

Does the Court have jurisdiction to allow Richardson to

withdraw his plea when he did not move to withdraw it before the
district court announced sentence?

Standard of Review.

This Court reviews jurisdictional issues as a

matter of law. State v. Samul, 2015 UT App 23,

,no, 343 P.3d 719, cert. denied,

362 P.3d 1255 (Utah), and cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1185 (2016).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are of central importance to this appeal:

Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(8) (West Supp. 2015)

(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the
court may require that the defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a·
county jail designated by the department, after
considering any recommendation by the court as to which
jail the court finds most appropriate; ....

Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (West Supp. 2015)

(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior
to conviction.
(2)
(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only
upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not
knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest,
except for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion
before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be
announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in
abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within
30 days of pleading guilty or no contest.
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the
time period specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued
under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Postconviction Remedies Act, and
Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Q

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As part of a plea deal in one case, the prosecution agreed to make
sentencing recommendations in two cases. The prosecution did not make
the agreed-to recommendations.
In the first case (the drug case), Richardson pleaded guilty and the
district court ordered a suspended prison sentence with three years'
probation.

R69-70.

Six months into that probation, Richardson was

arrested for retail theft and providing false personal information to a peace
officer (the theft case). R124-26; R*l-2. 1 In the drug case, Richardson's
probation officer submitted a probation violation report listing the charges
in the theft case along with four other probation violations, including failure
to participate in treatment, failure to report to AP&P, and several instances
of drug use. R125-26. The probation officer recommended terminating
Richardson's probation as unsuccessful and imposing a 365-day jail
sentence. R129.
In the theft case, Richardson pleaded guilty to retail theft. R*29. In
exchange, the prosecutor agreed to 1) drop the false-information charge;
2) recommend Richardson's release for pre-trial services; 3) not recommend
1

For clarity, the State adopts the record citation format used by
Defendant, using "R" to refer to the record in the drug case (case 131910770)
and "R*" to refer to the record in the theft case (case 141913501).
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prison at sentencing and "affirmatively recommend probation" so long as
Richardson was not charged with any new crimes; and 4) recommend that
Richardson's probation in the drug case be revoked and reinstated. R*25.
AP&P also prepared a pre-sentence report ("PSR").

The report

detailed Richardson's twenty-one prior convictions, mostly for drug- and
theft-related crimes. R*41-42, 54-56. Of those prior convictions, six resulted
in probation- excluding the drug case presently on appeal.

R*56-57.

Richardson violated the terms of his probation in all but two of those cases.
R*56-57.
The PSR noted that the probation violations in the drug case alone
"play like a 'broken record."' R*45. AP&P recommended that Richardson
serve 365 days in jail for violating probation in the drug case and that his
probation be terminated as unsuccessful. R129, R*46. AP&P recommended
in the theft case that Richardson be placed on three years' probation
following any jail time served in the drug case. R*41.
The district court held a combined sentencing and order-to-showcause hearing in the two cases. R*148. Defense counsel identified several
mitigating factors in the theft case and referred to the PSR recommendation
of probation. R*148-49. When the court turned to the State, the prosecutor
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simply said, "We'll submit it." R*149. Defense counsel did nothing to bring
the prosecutor's promise to the court's attention.2
Before reiterating his counsel's request for probation, Richardson
spoke of the progress he had made on probation and in other areas of his
life since he had pleaded guilty in the theft case. R*149-50. The district
court acknowledged the challenges Richardson faced and the recent
progress he had made.

R*150-51.

But the court also recognized his

repeated failures on probation. R*150-51. The court said, "I don't know
exactly ... how you can say you've been successful in probation. It's been a
mess." R*150-51. The district court then indicated it was inclined to impose
a jail term for the theft case:
I want you to know you're in the Matrix for prison. This is a
ridiculous case to send anybody to prison on, but I will start to
impose some jail time if I have to. You simply need to start
complying with probation. You need to actually do what they
tell you to do and stop using your drugs.
R*151. The court indicated it would "follow the recommendation of the
presentence report which really is place you back on probation." R*151.
The court explained it was "not even sure why" AP&P "just wants you in
jail for a year" on the probation violation, but that the court would "give

2

A different judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney were involved
when Richardson pleaded guilty in the theft case. R*29, 146-47.
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[Richardson] a chance on it" because the recommendation came from the
same agency that was supervising him. R*151.
Be£ore the district court could finish pronouncing the sentence in the
theft case, the probation officer spoke up and clarified that its
recommendation for probation in the theft case was contingent on
Richardson serving a jail term in the drug case, and that probation should
F,

Viii

not start until Richardson completed a one-year jail sentence in the drug
case. R*151-52. Thanking the probation officer for the clarification, the
court noted that it had "hesitated" "because of how much jail time" and
indicated that it had seen AP&P' s recommendations as "inconsistent,"
R*152, perhaps because AP&P recommended unsuccessful termination of
probation but only jail time in the drug case, and probation with no jail time
in the theft case. The court then picked up where it left off, sentencing
Richardson to a suspended prison term, placing him on three years'
probation, and ordering him to serve one year in jail. R*152.
Defense counsel requested a stay of the jail term, coupled with
electronic 1nonitoring, so Richardson could complete school, work, and care
for his mother. R*153-54; 156-57. The court allowed Richardson to report
to jail later that week to accommodate a final exam he had scheduled, but
the court otherwise rejected the request for further leniency:
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The problem is ... that I read the probation violation reports
and you've been a mess. You have a serious drug problem, a
serious mental health problem, and because of that you just
keep committing offenses. . . . And they've tried to send you
into treatment facilities, you leave or you ~iolate. I have to
give you some kind of a consequence ....
R*156-57.
In the drug case, Richardson admitted to the five probation violations
and the court terminated probation and sentenced him to one year in jail,
with the case to close upon completion of the sentence. R190; R*154-55, 157.
The court ordered the jail sentences in the two cases to run concurrently and
the probation term in the theft case to begin after completion of the jail
sentence. R*l00-01, 157.
Richardson timely appealed. R217; R*110.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Ineffective Assistance. The prosecutor breached the plea
agreement by failing to affirmatively recommend probation in the theft case
and failing to recommend that probation be revoked and reinstated in the
drug case. Richardson argues that defense counsel performed deficiently by
not alerting the district court to the prosecutor's promise. He also makes a
one-sentence argument that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure,
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suggesting that he would not have received any jail time had counsel raised
the issue.
Richardson has not shown that defense counsel performed deficiently
or that he was prejudiced by defense counsel's inaction. As a threshold
matter, this Court should affirm because Richardson has inadequately
briefed his prejudice argument. Richardson's one-sentence assertion does
G

not carry his burden to prove prejudice.

And because prejudice is an

essential element of any ineffective-assistance claim, his failure to establish
Q

prejudice is fatal to his claim.
Regardless, Richardson's ineffective assistance claim fails on the
merits. Although the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by failing to
"affinnatively" recommend probation in the theft case and by not
recommending revocation and reinstatement of probation in the drug case,
defense counsel nevertheless could have reasonably concluded there would
have been no benefit to bringing the terms of the plea agreement to the trial
G

court's attention.

Probation does not foreclose jail time; therefore, the

prosecutor could have recommended jail time as part of affirmatively
recommending probation.

And before the breach, the PSR had already

recommended jail time followed by a term of probation. Thus, not only
could defense counsel have reasonably concluded that enforcing the plea
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agreement would have made no material difference in the actual sentence,
he could have also concluded that doing so could have increased the chance
of receiving a sentence that included jail time. On these facts, Richardson
has not overcome the strong presumption that defense counsel's
performance was reasonable.
Nor has Richardson demonstrated that he was prejudiced. Because
the plea agreement did not bind the prosecutor to recommend probation
without jail time, Richardson cannot show that enforcing the plea
agreement likely would have led to a no-jail sentence. And even if the
prosecutor had recommended no jail time, it is unlikely the district court
would have ruled any differently.

The court made several statements

in~icating that it believed jail time was in order; it even indicated that it
thought that AP&P's recommended incarceration was low. So even if the
prosecutor had recommended no jail time-which he was not bound to do
in the first place - it likely would not have altered the court's ruling.

Point II: Jurisdiction.

Richardson argues that because of defense

counsel's ineffectiveness, he is entitled to either resentencing or withdrawal
of his guilty plea. But Richardson did not move for withdrawal of his guilty
plea below.

By statute, his failure to do so deprives the courts of

jurisdiction to allow withdrawal of the plea. Thus, in the event Richardson
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prevails on his ineffective assistance claim, the only remedy available to him
is resentencing.

ARGUMENT

I.
Because the prosecutor's agreement to recommend
probation did not prohibit the prosecutor from
recormnending a jail sentence as part of probation,
because the district court gave Richardson probation,
and because it is not reasonably likely that the court
would have given Richardson probation without a jail
sentence, Richardson has not proven that his counsel
was ineffective when he did not alert the court that
the prosecutor had breached his agreement to
affirmatively recommend probation.
A plea bargain is "essentially" a contract. Puckett v. United States, 556
U.S. 129, 137 (2009); see generally Santobello v. United States, 404 U.S. 257, 262
(1971) (applying contract principles to plea bargains).

A prosecutor

breaches that agreement by failing to fulfil a promise contained in the plea
bargain. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 137. 3
When the defendant preserves a claim of breach, he need not show on
appeal that his sentence would have been different in the absence of the
breach. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63; see also State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d
3

Though not at issue here, there are some "limits to the contract
analogy." State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(explaining that plea agreements '"are like conh·acts'" but '"are not
contracts"') (quoting United States v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir.
1990)).
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Q

1266, 1275 (Utah 1988) (discussing Santobello), superseded by statute on other

grounds as stated in State v. Swogger, 2013 UT App 164, ,I10, 306 P.3d 840. But
a showing of prejudice is required on an unpreserved claim, because when
a defendant fails to object in the district court, he forfeits the objection.

Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134-35, 143; see also State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, if 44, 361
P.3d 104 ("[U]npreserved federal constitutional claims are not subject to a
heightened review standard· but are to be reviewed under our plain error
doctrine."). Thus, to get relief on appeal, a defendant must show that an
exception to the preservation rule applies or that the failure to raise the
issue denied the defendant effective assistance of counsel. See State v. Low,
2008 UT 58, 119, 192 P.3d 867.

Both require the defendant to show a

reasonable likelihood that his sentence would have been different but for
the breach. See State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, if13, 253 P.3d 1082; see also

Puckett, 556 U.S. at 142 n.4 (describing prejudice in breach cases in terms of
the effect on the sentence).
Here

Richardson

argues-and

the

State

concedes-that

the

prosecutor breached the plea agreement by not affirmatively recommending
probation in the theft case and by not recommending that probation be
revoked and reinstated in the drug case. Aplt. Br. at 3. Richardson further
argues that defense counsel was deficient in not bringing that breach to the
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district court's attention. Aplt. Br. at 6. But for counsel's failure, Richardson
argues, "there is a high likelihood that the court would have given Mr.
Richardson a probationary, non-jail sentence, since both parties would have
made the san1e recommendation." Aplt. Br. at 6-7. 4
Richardson's ineffective assistance claim is inadequately briefed and
also fails on the merits. Probation does not foreclose a jail term as part of
the probation sentence.

Consequently, the prosecutor's agreement to

recommend probation did not foreclose him from asking for jail time.
Defense counsel could have reasonably concluded that it was better to have
the prosecutor submit the case with AP&P's recommendation without
pushing the prosecutor to add his own affirmative recommendation that
very well could have buttressed AP&P' s request for jail time. In any event,
Richardson functionally got what the prosecutor was bound to recommend:
probation rather than prison. Furthermore, given AP&P's recommendation,
the court's ultimate sentence, and the court's statements supporting that
(.

w

sentence, probation without a jail sentence was not likely even if the
prosecutor had affirmatively recmnmended no-jail probation.

4

At sentencing, defense counsel never asked for probation without a
jail term before the court pronounced sentence in the theft case. R*148-49.
But he did request a stay of the jail term that the court imposed. R*153-54.
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A. This Court should affirm because Richardson's onesentence prejudice argument is inadequately briefed.
The extent of Richardson's prejudice argument is his one-sentence
assertion that he would have received a more favorable sentence because
"both parties would have made the same recommendation." Aplt Br. at 67. That cursory assertion does not satisfy Richardson's burden on appeal.
To adequately brief an argument, a party must "go beyond providing
conclusory statements." West Jordan CihJ v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, 129, 135
P.3d 874. Rather, the appellant must identify and develop relevant legal
authority and present "reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v.

Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
Failure to do so equates to failure to carry the appellant's burden of
persuasion on appeal-a burden that "falls squarely upon an appellant."

State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, if 21, 147 P.3d 448. The appellant may not
"dump" that burden on the appellate court.

Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305

(internal quotation marks omitted).
To establish prejudice for an ineffective assistance claim, Richardson
must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).

The relevant result here is the

sentence. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 142 n.4. In other words, Richardson must
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show

that

had

defense

counsel

spoken

up,

the

prosecutor's

recon1mendation likely would have led to a more favorable sentence. 5
As demonstrated below, infra Part B, the factual record provides
abundant evidence to establish that the district court likely would not have
been influenced by the prosecutor's recommendation. Given the evidence
contrary to Richardson's position, Richardson fails to carry his burden on
appeal with a one-sentence assertion of prejudice. To find prejudice in the
face of such briefing would distort long-settled burdens on appeal and
effectively create a presumption of prejudice. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 141-43
(holding that a defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice from the
breach of a plea agreement when defendant failed to preserve the claim).
Because Richardson has inadequately briefed prejudice and because
prejudice is a necessary element for relief on an ineffective-assistance claim,
this Court should decline, on the basis of inadequate briefing, to reach the
sole claim Richardson raises on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(k).
B. Richardson has proved neither deficient performance
nor prejudice.

In any event, Richardson's ineffective assistance claim fails on its
1nerits because Richardson has not shown that defense counsel was
5

Even when the remedy at issue is withdrawal of the guilty plea, the
Supreme Court has clarified that the question of prejudice turns on whether
the sentence was likely affected. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 142 n.4.
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deficient or that Richardson was prejudiced by counsel's performance.
Either failure is fatal to Richardson's claim.
1. Counsel was not deficient because enforcement of the
plea agreement would not have required the prosecutor.to
recommend no jail time.

To prove deficient performance, Richardson must overcome "a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To do so, he
n1ust "persuad[ e] the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for
counsel's actions."

State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, if 6, 89 P.3d 162 (internal

quotation marks 0111itted). Richardson cannot do so here because counsel
reasonably-and correctly-could have concluded that the plea agreement
did not require the prosecutor to affirmatively recommend no jail thne.
The prosecutor agreed to affirmatively recommend probation.

But

probation does not foreclose imposing a jail term as part of the probation.

See Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(8)(v) (West Supp. 2015) ("While on probation,
and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the defendant ...
serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail .... "). And
Richardson cites nothing in the record to show that the prosecutor agreed to
recommend no jail time. As far as incarceration goes, the only guarantee
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Richardson received in the plea agree1nent was that the prosecutor would
not recmnmend prison in the retail case. It said nothing of jail. R*25.
The recommendation for the drug case was similar, though not as
explicit: The prosecutor agreed to recommend that probation would be
revoked and reinstated. R*25. Implicit in that agreement is a promise not to
recommend prison. Again, it said nothing of jail. Thus, under the terms of
the plea agreement, Richardson was not entitled to an affirmative
recommendation of no jail time.

Any enforcement of the agreement, in

tern1s of imprisonment, would thus have been limited to a recommendation
of no prison.
Furthermore, AP&P had already recommended probation in the theft
case and had refrained from recommending prison in the drug case. R129,
R*41. That recommendation was before the court when the prosecutor said,
"We'll submit it." R*148-49, 156. By submitting the cases with AP&P' s
recommendations,

the prosecutor was, for

all practical purposes,

recommending no prison time. In that situation, there would have been no
tactical reason to seek to enforce the plea agreement.

In fact, defense

counsel could have reasonably concluded that enforcing the plea agreement
could have led to the prosecutor affirmatively recomm.ending jail time, thus
reinforcing AP&P' s request and making a sentence that included a jail term
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c·.
~

even more likely than it already was.

Thus, defense counsel acted

reasonably in not brining that agreement to the district court's attention.

2. In any event, the district _court's statements demonstrate
that an affirmative recommendation from the prosecutor
was not reasonably likely to result in no-jail probation.
The only reason Richardson provides to establish a reasonable
likelihood of a different sentence is his assertion that the district court
would have been influenced by the prosecutor and defense counsel making
the same recom1nendation.

Aplt. Br. at 6-7.

Richardson's prejudice

argument thus hinges on the assumption that had defense counsel sought to
enforce the plea agreement, both parties would have made the same
recommendation: "a probationary, non-jail sentence." Aplt. Br. at 6-7. 6
But as shown, the prosecutor was not obligated to make the same
recommendation as defense counsel.

The prosecutor was free to

recommend jail time as a condition of probation in the theft case. R*25.
And even if the prosecutor had recommended that probation be revoked
and reinstated in the drug case-rather than terminated as unsuccessfulhe s~ill could have sought jail time as a condition of that probation. Thus,
enforcement of the plea agree1nent does not make a different sentence

6

As noted above, defense counsel never really asked for "a
probationary, non-jail sentence." Rather, he asked for probation and then
requested a stay of the jail term the court imposed. R*148-49, 153-54.
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reasonably likely. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) ("The
proof that such omissions prejudiced [a defendant] must be a demonstrable
reality and not a speculative matter." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In fact, in the theft case Richardson got exactly what the prosecutor
agreed to recommend- probation. And although the court did not reinstate
Richardson's probation in the drug case, it made the resulting jail sentence
coterminous with the jail sentence on the probation imposed in the theft
case.

So the outcome on the drug case did not change the length of

incarceration or the period for which Richardson would be under State
supervision.
And even if the prosecutor had been obligated to recommend no jail
time, Richardson still cannot demonstrate prejudice. "The likelihood of a
different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). Regardless of whether, in the abstract, a joint
recommendation by the prosecutor and defense counsel could conceivably
influence the court's sentence, in the context of this case it is not reasonably
likely that a joint recommendation would have led to a sentence more
favorable than the one imposed.
To begin with, Richardson's focus on the recommendation of "both
parties" ignores the recommendation of another significant player: AP&P.
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Aplt. Br. at 7._ Although AP&P recommended only probation for the theft
case, it recommended that Richardson serve one year in jail for violating
probation in the drug case and that his probation be terminated in that case
as unsuccessful. R*41, 46. The joint recommendation of the prosecutor and
defense counsel thus would have been undercut by AP&P's contrary
recommendation.
But the best indication that the outcome would not have been
different is the many statements the district court made indicating its
inclination to impose jail time in light of Richardson's history of crimes and
prior failures on probation. The PSR detailed a long history of drug and
theft crimes and a poor track record with probation. R*41-42, 54-57. In
fact, Richardson had violated probation in four of the previous six cases in
which he was sentenced to probation. R*56-57. The first violation led to the
revocation and unsuccessful termination of probation; the second led to
revocation and reinstatement; the third led to revocation and reinstatement,
followed by another violation that led to revocation and reinstatement,
followed by yet another violation that led to revocation and a jail sentence;
and the fourth led to revocation and a jail sentence. R*56-57. Furthermore,
in the drug case now on appeal Richardson admitted to five probation
violations, including the commission of the retail theft. R276.
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Referring to Richardson's troubled history with probation, the district
court said, "I don't know exactly ... how you can say you've been
successful in probation. It's been a mess." R*150-~1. The court reiterated
that sentiment later and added, "You have a serious drug problem, a serious
1nental health problem, and because of that you just keep committing
offenses." R*156-57. The court stated that it would "start to impose some
jail time" if necessary. R*151. The court also indicated it was skeptical of
AP&P's recommendation of only one year imprisonment, stating, "I'm not
even sure why" AP&P "just wants you in jail for a year" on the probation
violation. R*151. The court concluded, "[T]hey've tried to send you into
treatment facilities, you leave or you violate. I have to give you some kind
of a consequence .... " R*157.
The district court's statements, Richardson's long criminal record, and
his unsuccessful probation history all demonstrate that a more lenient
sentence was not more likely had defense counsel brought the plea
agreement to the court's attention. And even if a different outcome were
conceivable, it was not substantially or even reasonably likely.

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112.
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See

II.
Because Richardson did not move for withdrawal of
his plea before announcement of sentence, the courts
have authority to order only specific performance
(resentencing) as a remedy, in the event Richardson
prevails on appeal.

Richardson argues that, if he establishes ineffective assistance, he is
entitled to be resentenced or to have his guilty plea withdrawn in the theft
case. Aplt. Br. at 3, 5. But see Aplt. Br. at 7 (requesting only resentencing
where the prosecutor specifically performs what he promised). Neither this
Court nor the district court has jurisdiction to allow Richardson to
withdraw his guilty plea because Richardson did not request that remedy
before announcement of sentence. 7
When the State breaches a plea agreement, the court may generally
choose between two remedies:

withdrawal of the guilty plea or

resentencing with the benefit of the State's promised performance. Puckett,
556 U.S. at 137-38; State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, 'if17, 95 P.3d 1203. But the

7

Jurisdictional arguments are typically threshold questions that must
be addressed before reaching the merits of a claim. See State v. MardonizRosado, 2014 UT App 128, ,rs, 328 P.3d 864. But the jurisdictional issue here
goes only to the courts' authority to order one of two remedies. See Puckett,
556 U.S. at 137-38 (describing withdrawal and resentencing as two possible
re1nedies for breach of the plea agreement).
Because Richardson's
ineffective assistance claim is inadequately briefed and fails on its merits,
this Court need not reach the question of which remedy is jurisdictionally
permissible.
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Constitution does not require one remedy over the other. See Santobello, 404
U.S. at 262-63 (explaining that choice among re1nedies is left to discretion of
state courts).
In Utah, the legislature has chosen to limit the courts' authority to
allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. The Utah Code states,

11

A

request to withdraw a plea of guilty ... shall be made by motion before
sentence is announced." Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(b) (West Supp. 2015).
That limitation is jurisdictional. State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1 if 18, 247 P.3d 344;
Grimmett, 2007 UT 11,

if 8. When a defendant fails to request withdrawal

before sentence is announced, the availability of that remedy is limited to
the post-conviction relief process. See Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(c) (" Any
challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified m
Subsection (2)(b)

shall be pursued
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under Title

78B,

Chapter

9,

Postconviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure."). 8
Richardson did not move to withdraw his guilty plea. R*148-58. The
first time he has requested such relief is in his brief on appeal. Aplt. Br. at 3,
5. Therefore, if Richardson were to prevail on appeal, at most he would be
entitled to resentencing. The remedy of withdrawal of a guilty plea for
someone in Richardson's situation may only be sought and obtained, if at
all, through the post-conviction relief process. See Utah Code Ann. §77-136(2)(c); id. §78B-9-104(1)(d) (West Supp. 2015) (listing ineffective assistance
as a ground for post-conviction relief).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.

8

This Court's opinion in State v. Smit is not to the contrary. That case
held that the choice between the remedies for breach of a plea agreement is
left to "the discretion of the trial judge." 2004 UT App 222, 4f17. But the
defendant in Smit had made a motion to withdraw his guilty plea that was
timely under an earlier, controlling version of the statute. See id. ,i14-5; see
also Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(b) (West 2004) historical and statutory
notes (noting that prior version of the statute required a request to
withdraw guilty plea to be made by motion "within 30 days after the entry
of the plea"); Grimmett, 2007 UT 11, ~15 (noting that the supreme court had
interpreted the phrase "entry of the plea" in the earlier version of the statute
to refer to "the date of enh-y of final judgment").
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Addendum A

Addendum A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

t

Plaintiff,

STATEMENT OF DEF-NDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUIUfY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE
COUNSEL

,.

Case No~ 141913501

STATE OF UTAH,

OF

,re-'•

SPENCER RICHARDSON,
Defendant.

I, Spencer Richardson, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have ., een advised of
and that I understand the following facts and rights:
I
l

Notification of Charges

I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
;

Crime & Statutory
Provision

A.

Retail Theft w/ Priors

Degree

3

I

PunishmentI
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

o-s usP, $:b-sooo + 90%
II

l

1 have received a copy of the Infonnation against me. I have read it, or had it read
to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime to which I am ~leading guilty.
i

The elements of the crime(s) to ·which I. am pleading guilty (or no cbntest) are:
That on or about November 24. 2014 in Salt Lake Countv. Spencer Richai.dson. a party to
the offense. did knowinglv take possession. of. conceal.. carry away. transfdr or cause to be
carried away any merchandise displaved, held. stored or offered for ~ale in a retail
mercantile establishment with the intention of retaining such merchand~se or with the
intention of deprivin2: the merchant permanentlv of the possession. use orlbenefit of such
merchandise without paying the retail va]ue of such merchandise and hbd a qualifying
offense w/in ten years.
I

Revised September 28, 2011
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I

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I comm~tted the crimes
listed above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the
conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts prdvide a basis for
the court to accept my guilty pleas and prove the elements of the crime(sJ to which I am
pleading guilty (or no contest):
'I
On November 24 . 2014. in Salt Lake County. Mr. Richardson knowingly carried away
merchandise from the Sports Authority and intended to retain that mercliandise without
paving for those items and had a rior uali ine conviction in case 12190181 I.
Waiver of Constitutional Rights
i

I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the ~ollowing rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understan~ that if I plead
guilty I will give up all the following rights:

I

Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorrley and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney wilJ be appointed by the court at no ~ost to me. I

understand that I might later, if the judge detennined that I was able, be reqf ired to pay for
the appointed lawyer's service to me.
.
I have not waived my right to counsel.

1

If I have not waived my right to counsel, my ;I attorney is
M. E. Larson. .My attorney and I have ful1y discussed this statement, my'trights, and the
consequences of my guilty plea(s) .

.Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial y an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty.
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that ifl were to have

a trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testitied against me
and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the
opportunity to cross-examine alJ of the witnesses who testified against me.:
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a triJI, I could call

witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring!the attendance
and testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witn,_!sses to appear,
the State would pay those costs.
.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a trial, I would have the .right to testify on my own behalf. I also knot that if I chose
not to tesfrfy) no one could make me testify or make me give evidence ag1inst myself. I
also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they coui d not hold my
refusal to testify against me.
Revised September 28, 2011
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Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that ifi I do not plead
guilty, I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty pf the charged
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead --~ot guilty," and
my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden ~f proving each
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. j
I

I

I understand that ifl plead guilty, I give up the presumption ofinnocJnce and will be
admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
I
I

Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convictd by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I ould not afford
the costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I under~tand that I am
giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty. I understand that if I wish to
appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after I sentence is
entered.
i

1

illy
I

j

I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving arr'.r giving up all
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea(!
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be iniposed for each
I
crime to which I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crinhe that carries a
1
mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory 1·enalty for that
crime. I know my sentence may include a prison tem1, fine, or both.
I know that in addition to a fine, a ninety percent (90%) surcharge w,iill be imposed.
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) :lof my crimes,
including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed a~ part of a plea
agreement.

Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is !nore than one
crime involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they
may run at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged anl!additional fine
for each crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting
sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or whicTh I have plead
guilty), my guilty plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being iilnposed on me.
If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was i111prisoned or on
parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be inappro~riate.
,,
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'
!

Plea agreement. My guilty plea is the result of a plea agreement between myself
and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisio~s of the plea
agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below:
!

Count 2 false ersonal information to a eace officer is dismissed . Thb state a rees to
recommend Mr. Richardson's release at the time of his plea. The partie aeree that Mr.
Richardson shall get a presentence report from AP &P. At sentencing. the hate agrees not
to recommend prison and affirmatively recommend probation. so long as Mr. Richardson
is not charged with any new crimes between the time of his release and lthe time of his
sentencing. The state also aizrees to recommend that Mr. Richardson 'ls probation be
revoked and reinstated in case 13 I 910770.
J
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencin~\ concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reductioi of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecud. g attorney are
not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.

Immigration/Deportation: I understand that if I am not a Unite , States citizen,
my plea(s) today may, or even will> subject me to deportation under! United States
immigration laws and regulations, or otherwise adversely affect my imrtjigration status,
which may include permanently barring my re-entry into the United States!. I understand
that if I have questions about the effect of my plea on my immigration tatus, I should
consult with an immigration attorney.
·
1

Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness

I

I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty J No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my ', ttorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know t~at I am free to
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wisp to make any
changes because all of the statements are correct.
l
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.

I am
years of age. I have attended school through the
,
grade. I
can read and understand the English language. If I do not understadd English, an
interpreter has been provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs,
medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I d~cided to plead
guilty. 1 am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants
which impair my judgment.
11
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I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be men~ally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I ~m free of any
mental disease, defect, or impainnent that would prevent me from understaI: ding ·what I am
doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntaiily entering my plea.

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea(s), I mu · t file a written
motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand that for
a plea held iu abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be made
within 30 days of pleading guilty. I will only be allowed to withdraiv my plea if I
show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursu~d under the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 6SC of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
1

Dated this

"1.)

day of _ _
D_u=·'-=t_---"w-~_r_ _ _ _ _ _ _,-----~ 2o}t.r

Certificate of Defense Attorney
!i

I
certify
that
I
am
the
attorney
for
, the defendant above, and that 1 know he/she has read the statement or that , have read it to
him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully up.derstands the
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To ~he best of my
knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of tlte c.rime(s) and
the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stafed; and these,
along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.
{:' / ,

fjt(,~

gr,,f
--+-:-::a..--=--------...------

A TT ORNE Y FOR DEFENDANT
0
Bar No. ' 2~"
----
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney

I
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in thb case against
, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement ofDefendant and find that thelfactual basis of
the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true Jd correct. No
improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been of(ered defendant.
The plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in th~ attached Plea
Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is r4asonable cause
to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant Ht the offense(s)
for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance f the plea(s) would serve the
public interest.

PROSECUTillG ATTOr:.·~y
Bar No.
~dw ?:}

Revised September 28, 2011
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Order
Based on the facts set fo11h in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(~) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
1

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crirne(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this

:Z.1-

day of __lJ_(_·"'!-_~·_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,,

uY/

DISTRICT COURT JUD@E
i

I

Revised September 28, 2011
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Addendum B

A d dendum B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

vs.
SPENCER SCOTT RICHARDSON
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
) CASE NO.
)
)
)
)
)

141913501

BEFORE THE HONORABLE PAUL B. PARKER

THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84114

HEARING
ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED ON
MAY 4, 2015

Transcribed by:

Colleen C. Southwick, RPR/CSR

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
00146

2

1

APPEARANCES

2
3

4

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
MICHAEL P. BOEHM
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney

5

6
7

8

9

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
RUDY J. BAUTISTA
Attorney at Law

10
11

12
13
14

15
16
17

18
19
20

21
22

23

24
25

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
00147

~

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

1

MR. BAUTISTA:

2
3

Richardson matter, please.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. BAUTISTA:

6

There are two of them.

This is 131910770 and 141913501.
Your Honor, we're here for sentencing

as well as an order to show cause.
THE COURT:

7
8

Your Honor, can we address the Spencer

Mr. Bautista for the defendant.

is here for the State?

9

MR. BOEHM:

I am here.

10

THE COURT:

Mr. Boehm for the State.

11

And who

Are you Spencer

Scott Richardson?

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. BAUTISTA:

Yes, sir.

What's your birthdate?
7/29/69.

All right.

Go ahead, Mr. Bautista.

As I indicated, your Honor, we're here

17

for sentencing on case ending 3501 and an order to show cause

18

in case ending 0770.

19

first.

We'd like to address the sentencing

20

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

21

MR. BAUTISTA:

Your Honor, there is a presentence

22

report submitted.

Speaking with Mr. Richardson there are some

23

minor issues he'd had, however, they do not change the

24

recommendation in the presentence report so discussing that

25

we'd like to go forward with sentencing at this time.
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

This is a matter where Mr. Richardson has been

2

suffering from mental health issues and has been making the

3

most that he can to move his life forward.

4

going to school to make himself a better person.

5

final this Wednesday.

6

struggling to keep his life in order because his mother suffers

7

from Parkinson's disease.

8

does take care of his mother.

9

excuse, but part of his issues have been following through with

10
11

He's involved in
He has a

In addition to that, he's been

He does live with his mother and he
And he's not using it as an

his counseling to make sure he stays substance abuse free.
He has met with ARS and has kept completing the

12

evaluation and is looking forward to complying with probation

13

if he's given that privilege as well as following through with

14

all the counseling recommendations and further schooling

15

himself to make sure he moves forward from this occurrence and

16

makes himself a better person.

17

THE COURT:

The State.

18

MR. BOEHM:

We'll submit it.

19

THE COURT:

Mr. Richardson, you have the right to

20

make a statement before I impose sentence.

21

you'd like to say?

22

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, your Honor.

Is there anything

It's just been

23

recently in probably the last six months that I've really

24

realized the frailty of my mother, that she's in her twilight,

25

you know, and helping her out.

You know I was 13 days old when

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

I was adopted by her and now I've been able to give back to

2

her.

3

you know,

4

to school and stuff.

5

violated my probatibn and stuff.

Our relationship wasn't really that good until recently,
for me to tie her shoes, to go on small walks and go
You know I did a lot of wrong things.

I

I'm sorry for that.

The last six months I've been doing good complying

6
7

with probation.

I've taken their classes and stuff.

8

a huge concern.

I don't want to miss out on this last little

9

bit with my mother.

Like I said,

It's just

I've been doing good with

10

probation the last few months, you know, going to my classes,

11

attending things.

12

Wednesday.

13

realized my life impacts a lot of people and especially my dear

14

mother.

15

physical condition.

16

I know -- you know I've got a final this

I was a very selfish person before and now I've

She wasn't able it make it today because of her

I'm asking that you allow me to continue with

17

probation, get a job.

18

referred to the Deseret Industries and stuff.

19

employment class with the AP&P which was a real eye opener.

20

Vocational rehab has accepted me.

21

lawyer.

22

know I've not got a pretty past, but I can only go forward from

23

today.

24
25

Attending meetings.

THE COURT:
exactly

I'm working with my bishop.

Okay.

I've been

I also took an

I showed the papers to my

I'm just trying to do a 180.

Sir,

I mean,

I don't know

and I know you have some struggles -- how you can
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

say you've been successful in probation.

2
3

THE DEFENDANT:

I'm just talking about the last few

months that I've been

4
5

It's been a mess.

THE COURT:

It's true I haven't had any recent

allegations that you have been a problem.

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

Right.

But regardless of your mother's health,

8

none of that is rationalization for this.

9

you're in the Matrix for prison.

10

I want you to know

This is a ridiculous case to

send anybody to prison on, but I will start to impose some jail
~'1

~

11

time if I have to.

12

probation.

13

and stop using your drugs.

You simply need to start complying with

You need to actually do what they tell you to do

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE COURT:

You understand that?
Yes.

Having said that,

I will follow the

16

recommendation of the presentence report which really is place

17

you back on probation.

18

probation violation just wants you in jail for a year, but

19

given it's from the same agency I'll give you a chance on it.

20

Frankly I'm not even sure why the

On the third degree felony,

retail theft,

I ' l l impose

21

zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, a fine of $5000

22

plus a 90 percent surcharge.

23

all of the --

24

AP&P AGENT:

25

THE COURT:

I will suspend the imposition of

Your Honor -Yes.
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1
2

AP&P AGENT:

(inaudible) with Adult Probation &

Parole.

3

THE COURT:

4

AP&P AGENT:

5

Agent

Are you his agent?
I am, sir.

Also the officer of the PSI

as well as the order to show cause.

6

THE COURT:

Thank you for explaining yourself,

7

AP&P AGENT:

sir.

With the sentencing (inaudible)

8

contingent upon the sentencing of the order to show cause to

9

the jail time.

10

THE COURT:

11

AP&P AGENT:

So you want a year and then -Yes, sir.

The new probation period

12

would not begin until the conclusion of jail time at the close

13

of the prior case.

14

THE COURT:

Thank you very much.

I appreciate that

15

explanation because that's why I hesitated is because of how

16

much jail time.

17

of it and I was frankly a little bit confused because of the

18

recommendations that I saw to be inconsistent, but I will

19

suspend, again, the prison time all but a year in the Salt Lake

20

County Jail.

21

Parole for 36 months on the following conditions:

22

I usually write that when I go down in front

Place you on probation to Adult Probation and

First of all,

that you follow the usual and ordinary

23

conditions of probation, that is that you sign your probation

24

agreement, that you not have any further offenses, you comply

25

with all the laws.

You allow yourself to be searched,

your
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1

person, your vehicle, your home.

2

Probation & Parole to really do whatever evaluation and

3

assessment they need to do.

4

I will also authorize Adult

Clearly you need a mental health evaluation and

5

further treatment.

6

you to enter in to complete.

7

abuse evaluation, enter into whatever programming that they are

8

going to require you to do as well.

9

no alcohol.

Can't possess, use,

10

substances.

Can't be around any people who are, be in bars or

11

parties where it normally is.

12

Whatever programming they direct you I want
You clearly need a substance

Complete that.

No drugs,

consume any of those

You are to follow your doctor's care to take that

13

medication which is prescribed for you.

14

and complete cognitive therapy.

15

in the amount of $428.88.

Take a theft cat class

You're also to pay restitution

16

Any questions?

Take him into custody --

17

MR. BAUTISTA:

Your Honor?

18

THE COURT:

for his year in jail.

19

MR. BAUTISTA:

Your Honor, in regards to the year in

20

jail, we're asking for several alternatives.

No. 1, because he

21

has a final on this Wednesday and he's been checking in with

22

probation, if you do order that he be incarcerated, we ask he

23

be allowed to surrender on Friday.

24

to surrender, then that would be a probation violation that

25

would warrant a prison sentence imposed.

He understands if he fails

In the alternative
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1

we're asking if the Court would consider imposing the jail but

2

staying its imposition for 95 days, put him on an electronic

3

monitoring with AP&P and see how he progresses from that point

4

in time on in consideration that he cares for his mother.

5

would allow him to finish his exams so that he can have

6

completion with college education and allow him to have better

7

opportunities for employment so that he can care for his

8

mother.

9

That

He understands that with jail being imposed that it

10

can be imposed at any moment if he violates the stay.

11

review if he hasn't been 110 percent in compliance and really

12

convinced AP&P otherwise, then he'll go to jail at that point.

13

THE COURT:

And upon

Let's deal with the order to show cause

14

because that's related to it.

He is charged on a probation

15

violation report dated last year, is it not,

16

was signed December 10 th 2014.

17

it is dated the 9th of December 2014.

2014?

I think it

The affidavit which supports
Is that correct?

18

MR. BOEHM:

Yes.

19

THE COURT:

Sir, you have the right to have the State

20

prove that you violated your probation.

21

these, you will relieve them of that burden.

22

to admit or deny the allegations?

23

MR. BAUTISTA:

24

THE COURT:

25

No,

Okay.

If you admit any of
Is it his intent

admit, your Honor.
Which ones will he be admitting?

All of them?
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1

MR. BAUTISTA:

2

THE COURT:

All of them, yes.

Okay.

Sir, you're charged with using a

3

controlled substance on August the 11 th and the 2s th ,

4

with having used a controlled substance on August 1s th ,

5

having failed to complete the treatment as directed on

6

August 27 th of 2014; with having failed to report as directed

7

on Septem];:>er the 4th, 2014, by having committed the offense of

8

retail theft,

9

November 24 th ,

2014;

2014;

I believe the one he was sentenced on on

2014, and having committed the offense of

10

false information to a peace officer on or about the 24 th of

11

November 2014.

12

Do you admit or deny these allegations?

13

MR. BAUTISTA:

14

information he admits.
THE COURT:

15
16

Your Honor, except for the false
The false information was --

All right.

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:
admissions.

I admit them, your Honor.

All right.

I am accepting those

Find that you have violated your probation.

Does AP&P want to say anything further than what you

20
21

said before?

22

jail sentence as some kind of further stick.

23

think?

24
25

To

allegations 1 through 5, admit or deny?

17

19

We'll strike that one.

And you heard their request is to try and use the

AP&P AGENT:
prior to this.

Your Honor,

What do you

I did talk to his attorney

We are willing to allow him to self report as
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1

of Friday so he can complete that.

2

officer.

3

does have finals this week.

He said he was taking one class at the college and he

4
5

THE COURT:

8

Okay.

AP&P AGENT:

In all honesty, your Honor, he knew this

was happening at the time this offense occurred and Itm not
(inaudible).

(The transcriber cannot hear what the probation

9

10

officer is saying.

11

noise.)

12

THE COURT:

13

What about their idea of letting

him out to take care of his mother?

6
7

I did confirm with the

Friday.

There is too much background

All right.

I'll let him report on this

When is the test?

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE COURT:

It's Wednesday.

But you need to report by -- well,

if the

16

test is on Wednesday, let's have you report -- when is it on

17

Wednesday?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

it.

22

for my mother.

I believe it is 9:10 we start.

When is the test done?
I believe they allow two hours for

It would be nice to be able to kind of help set things up

THE COURT:

23

You're going to be back in on Wednesday

24

at 5:00.

25

violation reports and you've been a mess.

The problem is this is that I read the probation
You have a serious
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1

drug problem, a serious mental health problem, and because of

2

that you just keep committing offenses.

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

Right.

You need to be able to succeed.

5

they've tried to send you into treatment facilities,

6

or you violate.

7

okay?

8

9

you leave

I have to give you some kind of a consequence,

THE DEFENDANT:

Is the 90 days on the ankle

monitor

10
11

And

THE COURT:

The 90 days is not on the table.

You

report Wednesday.

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

I will do that.

So the sentence then on the

14

probation violation is one year and closed then.

15

probation only on the felony matter and the jail time on the

16

felony matter will run concurrent with the jail time here,

17

it will just be one year and then he'll be back out on

18

probation.

19

MR. BAUTISTA:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. BAUTISTA:

22

He'll be on

so

r.
~

Yes, your Honor.

Okay.

Good luck to you, sir.

Was the whole case to be revoked and

reinstated or?

23

THE COURT:

Closed.

24

MR. BAUTISTA:

25

THE COURT:

Closed.

That's what I said, closed.
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1
2
3

4

THE DEFENDANT:

Is there any chance of a review

during this year?
THE COURT:

You talk to your attorney about that and

we'll see later on.

5

(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED

6

MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.)

7

8
9

10

11
12
vJ

13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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1

2
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